Persons and Values in Pragmatic Phenomenology
Explorations in Moral Metaphysics

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Series in Philosophy of Personalism

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Introduction

by Kenneth W. Stikkers

At the time of his death in 1928, Max Scheler was perhaps the most celebrated philosopher in all of Europe. Martin Heidegger described him as “the strongest philosophical force in Germany, nay, in all Europe—and even in all contemporary philosophy.”¹ He fell into relative obscurity, however, in large measure because he was the first German intellectual of his notoriety to speak out against the Nazis, and, as a result, his books were placed on their index, cleared from the German libraries, and burned.

Also, though, Heidegger had included Scheler especially in his general assault upon value theory and the very notion of ‘value,’ as a continuation of Plato’s notion of forms. “What, then, does the Being of values … really amount to ontologically?” Heidegger asks already in his 1927 Sein und Zeit. “Values are predeterminations of things present-to-hand,” he answers. “In the final analysis, values have their ontological origin solely in the pregiven signs of the reality of things as their foundation. Value predicates,” therefore, “only presuppose again pure presence-at-hand as the sort of Being belonging to goods.”² Thus here and in his accompanying 1928 lectures, Heidegger claims that ‘value,’ as a constant presence, ignores the ecstatic temporality of Dasein, whereby all entities, including values, are rendered present only “out of a future that remains forever beyond the span of the present.”³ Heidegger expanded his attack on value theory in his 1947

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¹ As quoted by Thomas Sheehan, Introduction to Scheler, “Reality and Resistance: On Being and Time,” Listening 12, no. 3 (Fall 1977): 61
volume on Plato’s theory of Truth: there he claimed to link all nineteenth-century notions of ‘value’ to the Platonic ‘agathon,’ asserting that ‘value,’ like the Platonic notion, is merely the “presentative foreground” of the Truth of Being, rather than the grounding for it. In his “Letter on Humanism” (1949), Heidegger claimed,

Every ‘valuing’ … is a subjectivizing. It does not let beings be. Rather, valuing lets beings be valid—solely as the objects of its doing. The bizarre effort to prove the objectivity of values does not know what it is doing. …thinking in values is the greatest blasphemy imaginable against Being. To think against values therefore, does not mean to beat the drum for the valueless and nullity of things. It means rather to bring the lighting of the truth of Being before thinking, as against subjectivizing beings into mere objects.

‘Values,’ according to Heidegger, following Nietzsche, are “nothing but postulations of self-interest, which serve the will-to-power in securing itself by providing a necessary constant, a surrogate for Being.”

Further, in Holzwege (1950) Heidegger claims that ‘value’ is the “objectification of needs as goals,” stemming from the reduction of an object to representation: the thing so reduced loss of Being, ‘value’ is ascribed to the object as compensation for such loss, and then such ‘value’ is reified. ‘Value’ is thus “the impotent and threadbare disguise of the objectivity of whatever is,” “a poor substitute for Being.” “No one dies for mere values.”

The ferocity of Heidegger’s attacks, as illustrated by the above statements, has effectively silenced discussion of ‘value’ in German and French philosophy ever since, despite the fact that, as Manfred S. Frings, Hans Reiner, and Philip Blosser, among others, have well

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5 As quoted by Philip Blosser, Scheler’s Critique of Kant’s Ethics (Athens: Ohio University Press, 1995), 76.
6 E.g., Person und Dasein: Zur Frage der Ontologie des Werteins, Phänomenologica, Vol. 32 (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1969, and “The Background of
shown, they are phenomenologically unsupportable. Already Husserl had delineated various strata in the experience of ‘value,’ distinguishing the phenomenological givenness of an object’s value-quality from ‘value’ as the objectification of such a quality, and as Scheler demonstrated, values are intuited or felt as objective, in the sense that they are given as features of some experienced object and as independent of any human subject, and they definitely are not experienced as being “posited” by any act of the human subject’s will to power, as Heidegger, following Nietzsche, claims them to be. For example, the beauty of a sunset is concretely experienced as a quality of the sunset, and only later, in reflective theorizing, might it be speculatively postulated as residing in ‘the eye of the beholder.’ Indeed, Scheler systematically rejects, one by one, all the familiar subjectivist theories of value—hedonism, emotivism, utilitarianism, nominalism, relativism—i.e., every theory that reduces value to egoistic subjectivity.

By contrast to Edmund Husserl, who places ‘value’ on the same level of phenomenological givenness as the sensible qualities of objects,
Scheler claims ‘value’ to precede, in the order of phenomenological givenness, all sensible qualities: “Value-ception precedes perception,” Scheler claims.10 “Value precedes its object; it is the first ‘messenger’ of its particular nature.”11 For example, the disvalue of pain announces itself and is felt prior to any connection between it and the sensible qualities of the hot pan that I have unthinkingly grabbed and only latter, in reflection, identify as the ‘cause’ of my pain. Or, one of Scheler’s own examples: “I ‘feel the beauty of snow-covered mountains in the light of the setting sun’” prior to the perceived qualities that ‘cause’ such a feeling.12 Indeed, for Scheler, ‘value’ names the valence, or attractive power—repulsive power, in the case of disvalues—by which an object first seizes one’s attention and first announces itself, as the preceding examples illustrate. I am seized by the pain of the hot pan or by the beauty of a sunset as the “first messenger” of these phenomena, and in this sense, as noted above, ‘values’ can be described as ‘objective’: in no way can the pain and beauty be described phenomenologically as “subjectivizings,” as Heidegger insisted all instances of valuing to be.

Long before becoming the target of Heidegger’s generic attack upon value theory, Scheler painstakingly worked to distinguish his under-

11 Formalismus, p. 41; Formalism, 18.
12 Formalismus, p. 271; Formalism, 256.
standing of values from Platonic forms, although Heidegger repeatedly ignored such efforts. Already in his 1897 dissertation Scheler stated clearly,

As to the question, ‘What is value?’ I submit the following answer: insofar as the word ‘is’ in this question refers to existence (and not only to a mere copula), a value ‘is’ not at all. The concept of value does not allow any more of a definition than the concept of being.\(^{13}\)

Again in his magnum opus, Der Formalismus in der Ethik und die materiale Wertethik, Scheler insisted that values enjoy no ontological status apart from concrete human acts:\(^{14}\) values ride “on the back” of such acts.\(^ {15}\) Just as one must distinguish the phenomenological notion of “eidos” from any such metaphysical notion, such as Plato’s forms, so must we distinguish a Schelerian notion of ‘value’ from the Platonic ‘agathon.’

While Scheler describes clearly phenomenologically how values are manifest in concrete human experiences and makes clear what they are not—they are not Platonic forms or egoistic “subjectivizings”—scholars have found Scheler lacking, as J. Edward Hackett’s present volume notes, a precise ontological account of what values ‘are’: what is the being of values? As Hackett also notes, the best clue that Scheler provides is that a value is a “being-in-act” (Aktsein), but what that means precisely remains unclear within Scheler’s own corpus.

That values reside ontologically solely in concrete acts, however, is a notion that is central to theories of value found among American pragmatists. John Dewey, for instance, in his Theory of Valuation, distinguishes between ‘value’ as a noun and ‘value’ as a verb and argues for the primacy of the latter over the former.\(^ {16}\) Scheler would

\(^{14}\) Formalismus, pp. 19-21; Formalism, xxvii-xxx.
\(^{15}\) Formalismus, p. 49; Formalism, 27.
wholeheartedly concur. There is no evidence that Scheler ever read Dewey firsthand, although he had heard of and referred to him in several instances, but he was ecstatic to find in his reading of William James’s *Pragmatism*, some years after writing his *Ethics*, James’s notion of the “functionalization of essences”: Scheler described James as a “genius” and as one of the most original metaphysicians since Aristotle for offering what he judged to be the first genuine alternative in Western philosophy’s millennia-long debate between realism and nominalism: as James describes, neither do ideas precede our concrete, experiential encounters with things—“ideae ante res” (Plato)—nor are they derived from such encounters—“ideae post res” (Aristotle)—but they reside ontologically, find their being, are “functionalized,” solely in concrete human acts—“ideae cum rebus.”

‘Values’ *function* as guides for the organism to objects of satisfaction. Such is the being of values for Scheler. As Manfred Frings explains, in his extensive discussion of Scheler’s appropriation of American pragmatism, “Moral goodness (and evil), then, ‘functionalizes’ itself on the occasion of [concrete acts of] preferring (or rejecting) ….” In American pragmatism Scheler discovers powerful conceptual tools for refining his own theory of ‘value’ and for answering Heidegger’s criticisms that labeled him as a ‘Platonist,’ although Scheler himself never articulates specifically for himself how his encounter with American pragmatism, especially James’s, helped to clarify his understanding of ‘value’ in particular.

The main contribution of Hackett’s current book is that it substantially fleshes out, following Scheler’s own clues and preliminary work by others, such as Frings, the meaning of ‘value’ as ‘act-being,’ in what Hackett very aptly terms “participatory realism.” He describes very

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18 *Philosophy of Prediction*, 86.
clearly and precisely how persons, as understood by Scheler, participate, through their acts, in the creation of values, bringing them into being, through their concrete engagement with a world whose reality is primordially manifest in its resistance to life-urge, or impulsion (*Lebensdrang*). Values thus have no ideal being in advance of such acts, or a priori, “ante res” (Plato), nor are they the mere “subjectivizings” of any will to power, projected onto things, “post res” (Nietzsche, Heidegger). Rather, they come into real being through persons’ concrete acts of preferencing.

What is perhaps most original in his analysis, though, is Hackett’s use of Heidegger’s notion of “Befindlichkeit,” Dasein’s active way of being-in-the-world, ecstatically and temporally, to facilitate his articulation of “participatory realism.” He thus contributes significantly to understanding better the debate between Scheler and Heidegger over ‘values’ and suggests that Heidegger was not as much in disagreement with Scheler as his (mistaken) criticisms of Scheler assert. Hackett thereby brings together Scheler, James, and Heidegger in a highly creative, original, and productive way that moves the understanding of ‘values’ beyond the stale, centuries-long debate over their mere metaphysical ‘objectivity’ or ‘subjectivity.’
Preface

This book brings together several published papers and the overall research trajectory of the last five years of my life. The questions I have been asking myself and to which I will be writing on are twofold: What is the person? And, what are values? In answering the latter question, I arrived at an answer within the boundaries of Max Scheler, the German phenomenologist, but consequently started to explore the depths of which Scheler's value ontology was predicated on certain assumptions about the person. From these questions, I started to draw upon philosophical approaches that thematize experience—pragmatism and phenomenology. This transition, however, is indicative of how the questions changed once I thematized experience: How are values experienced? How is the person revealed in the very experience of itself?

More precisely, in thematizing experience, I realized that the ontology of value for Scheler (and for everyone considering the metaphysics of value) resided in a person's act intentionality. Hence, the answer was before me the whole time, but I could not see it. Value ontology is rooted in the being-of-an-act of intentional feeling. As such, my answer to the deficit of an ontology of value in Scheler rested on interpreting his affective intentionality in much the same way that Heidegger employed phenomenology to discern the ontological care structure of Dasein. Phenomenology – once a neutral method to describe structures of appearances – became an ontological clarification of those very same structures it sought to describe. The ontology of value rests on the manner in which values were realized by a person's intentionality for Scheler, by the manner in which person's participated in intentional feeling. In this way, Scheler's intentionality gave rise to value, and I embraced this as a metaphysical explanation of what values are *tou court* by unearthing the very intentional feeling act structure in his work. Moreover, the intentional act life is the source of participation. In this way, I came to defend a process-based account of value, and I call this account *participatory realism*. By participatory realism, I understand that values have their origin in the process of
affective intentionality since intentionality is generative of meaning, but also discloses the essences of reality that find sedimentation from this generativity of intentionality.

I want to be clear here that this manuscript is not solely a piece in Scheler scholarship. Primarily, my concern is with making explicit why my interpretation of Scheler can be an explanation for values in the first place. If you want to pigeonhole it, the manuscript has the concerns of traditional metaethics (the metaphysics of value), but attempts to solve this problem through phenomenology (what values are is answered by how values are disclosed in experience) and ultimately connecting that disclosure to lived-experience (pragmatism).

One might ask exactly wherein did James enter the picture if this work germinated in an encounter with Scheler’s writings? One pragmatic impetus is clear from the start. Like William James, a metaphysics only makes insofar as it helps me engage with the world—that it can explain the aesthetic, moral, and spiritual interests of persons. In addition, William James’s thinking is employed as a corrective measure to Scheler. With these two facts in mind, how James enters into my engagement with Scheler is a complicated story, and so for the remainder of this introduction, I will confess why I chose the label pragmatic phenomenology. Through this story, one will find that a pragmatic phenomenology emerges. This pragmatic phenomenology is still in its infancy in my thought, and undoubtedly there will be creative tensions and differences emerge here. While I haven’t fully articulated it, I can at least say a few provisional remarks before the survey of chapters about pragmatic phenomenology.

First, phenomenology is never pure as Husserl insisted—a fact Merleau-Ponty and Heidegger understood very well. Within phenomenology, one can listen to Husserlians spout off about the possibility of a transcendental phenomenology, but such an endeavor is never itself metaphysically neutral precisely because there will be a time in which a phenomenologist (no matter if they are an existential or transcendental phenomenologist) reifies one aspect of the intentional act-side or object-side of that relation. Second, once reification occurs, they start to speculate about the side in question. At this moment, the speculative aspect of their efforts assumes that the intentional relation is primitively-basic to all experiencers and they are now no longer
neutral, but engaged in some type of fundamental ontology. Like every phenomenologist, Scheler is guilty of this, but like Heidegger's awareness of this fact, we can now read Scheler ontologically with respect to the affective intentional relation that discloses the reality of values.

However, with respect to all speculative efforts, we must keep it within the boundaries of experience. We must think of these speculative efforts as ways to enhance the very practical nature of human experience they seek to disclose—this is where Jamesian pragmatism enters my philosophical story. Jamesian pragmatism is open to the reality of contents of experience, but those contents must provide a conceivable effect to my experience as well as yours. Put another way, if we were only phenomenologists, our efforts would merely be passive in describing phenomena and not seek to construct pathways forward. Phenomenology can only open up eidetic seeing if that eidetic seeing is connecting the prospects of concrete experience and that means eliciting the very effects such eidetic seeing has on practical action. When phenomenology is good, it serves as a pathway to speculation and construction of philosophical systems that enhance practical action. For this reason, I now describe my efforts as working in pragmatic phenomenology and in what follows, I will provide a sense of its emergence in the moral metaphysics explored about persons and values in the chapters to follow.

In the first chapter, I am thinking like a phenomenologist and asking how values are given to experience. By understanding value's givenness independently of either thinker, ontological clues can be gleaned about whether Heidegger or Scheler can answer the givenness of values on its own terms as a phenomenon. Those familiar with Heidegger, however, know fully well Heidegger's neglect of value in his fundamental ontology (not to mention in his own personal life). It's for this very reason that his account calls for interrogation and exploration. From that neglect and value's givenness, Scheler's account allows for the fullness of values to manifest. Whereas Heidegger interprets values as present-at-hand phenomena and regards ethics as an encounter with ontic phenomena, Scheler can better accommodate the givenness of value as they are experienced at an ontological level—even
if as we note in the very beginning, Scheler did not explicate what his thought meant ontologically.

For the second chapter, I do not assume the compatibility of thematizing pragmatism and phenomenology outright. Instead, I show how this compatibility resonates with Husserl and James, and it’s often in the tradition of comparing Husserl and James that many find James’s thought compatible with phenomenology. Specifically, I construct a humanism that is closely connected to James’s radical empiricism and Husserl’s phenomenology of experience. Most of the literature in the early and middle part of the 20th century tried to establish connections between James’s *Principles of Psychology* and not his radical empiricism, yet it’s in his radical empiricism where themes of relatedness, feeling, and ultimately something akin to intentionality are discovered. In so doing, I argue for a humanism that is open to the many multiple types of relations we can have on an experiential level (including of course the phenomena of values and persons) rather than eliminativist impulses and move towards a pragmatic phenomenology.

Since I am required to make my case for participatory realism in Scheler, the third chapter stands alone as both an interpretation internal to Scheler studies, but also my first attempt to situate that interpretation in the broader context of where that interpretation has led in my subsequent work. The case for participatory realism rests on the fact that being-in-an-act (*Akt-sein*) provides the general contours of Scheler’s value ontology. More specifically, analyzing being-in-an-act reveals how phenomenology opens up into an ontology. When we pay attention to this intentional feeling structure, Scheler answers how values become realized by persons, and it’s this very ontological feature (not a solely phenomenological feature) that becomes apparent to me as both the source of value emanating from personal feeling acts and the point of departure for all speculation concerning value ontology. Put more generally, phenomenological descriptions are no longer ontologically neutral as the phenomenologists claim—a point James makes about how practical interest shapes all forms of inquiry—but instead become the ontological emanating source of how values are realized between subjects. Persons must participate within intentional feeling acts for values to acquire an ontological reality.
The exploration of persons and values also demands a separate engagement with persons. As one will discover when reading these pages, I have given more weight to the importance of values, so a chapter exploring the depth of Scheler’s phenomenological personalism is necessitated by that weight alone. Entangled with the ontological reality of values is the ontological source of their realization—persons. In fact, one cannot have thoroughly coherent ethics without paying attention to the ontological reality of values and persons. In this fourth chapter, I discuss the root of Scheler’s concept of the person, how that concept originates in phenomenology, and the implication it possesses for ethics in general.

To say that intentional feeling acts are the source of value between persons and that persons participate in phenomenological essences suggests an account of how participatory realism works. This is the goal of the fifth chapter. The how-it-works part is best shown in what I call spiritual living. For the German philosophical tradition, Geist can mean many things. For Scheler, spirit (Geist) is the phenomenological component of the person that can nullify more earthly ontic and biological drives in favor of realizing that which is non-natural. By showing that spiritual living is an openness to value realization in intentional feeling and that both James and Scheler provide resources for fleshing out what it means to realize higher values over lower ones, I can clarify what this ontological participation amounts to in participatory realism.

One objection that I feel deserves its own chapter is the ambiguity of Scheler’s phenomenology and the Christian asceticism one finds in his phenomenology, and this is the goal of the sixth chapter. Of course, Scheler’s a faithful Catholic in his early phenomenological period influenced by Augustine, and this opposition between the decreasing relevance of the body (and perhaps the later opposition in his metaphysics between Geist and Drang) is an echo of these assumptions. Moreover, this is also the most dangerous element of phenomenology—the confirmation of biases as self-evident disclosures in first-personal experience. For this reason, we need to overcome biases and redirect phenomenological efforts back towards eliciting experience, and in order to do this, I once again turn to James as a corrective measure to Scheler’s thought. Specifically, the James-Lange hypothe-
sis is to Scheler what Merleau-Ponty’s attention to embodiment is to phenomenology more generally. For me, the lived-body is also a source of ontology and an ontological anchor of act-center of the person.

One might insist upon asking why James and not Merleau-Ponty and to that I can only answer that both James and Scheler have a similar (if not identical) commitment to affective intentionality. Participatory realism is a commitment to the phenomenological and pragmatic fact that our first ontological relation to the world is affective, emotional, and it’s in affective intentional feeling that first carves up objects of experience into the world but is also the source of the content for participation. Our participation is partly embodied and to lose sight of the body, I feel, would derail a proper phenomenological report of what it is we are attempting to describe even if those descriptions are not as neutral as phenomenologists assume.

For the seventh chapter, I reverse the priority one finds in my earlier efforts between James and Scheler. Up until this point, James has been corrective to Scheler, yet we also find once again phenomenology in James even though James is writing at a time independently of any phenomenological influence. In his *The Moral Philosopher and Moral Life*, James engages in speculation about value ontology, and within the complexity of his thought experiment a similar complexity of value-rankings can be discovered that one also finds in Scheler. One reason to include this essay as a chapter is to show that the resonance between James and Scheler is more than just James correcting Scheler’s overreach.

In the final chapter, participatory realism is contrasted against other forms of realism in analytic metaethics. Typically, moral realists inherit the bifurcation of nature that phenomenologists and classical pragmatists all attempt to overcome, but due to the analytic and Continental divide, many of these vocabularies as well as those that employ them do not mix. For the analytic metaethicist, moral realism means adopting cognitivism, which means that moral judgments are truth-apt, and thinking that there exist mind-independent standards that fix the truth of moral judgments. A moral nonnaturalist (as a type of moral realist) might think the proposition “We ought to give to charity” is true because it is fixed by the standards set forth by God. In this way,
the truth of moral claims demands an independent ontological source apart from the mind apprehending the proposition in question. For the analytic metaethicist, the problems of value are articulated with this metaphysical separation in mind—even if the analytic metaethicist denies moral realism of some variety, the denial of moral realism is understood with the separation of subjects and world.

By contrast, participatory realism seeks to offer a different way of thinking about realism. For me, realism is about the process to which subjects emotively intuit values and realize those values into action without dividing up the subject's lived-experience from the very world in which values acquire their intersubjective reality. What’s interesting about moral realists is that we can show why their commitments to moral realism can be explained by showing Scheler’s phenomenology as undergirding their position while at the same time showing that moral realists should be Schelerian participatory realists. By doing so, I hope to show how pragmatic phenomenology can make inroads into metaethics and provide perhaps another bridge built to cross the Analytic and Continental Divide.
In this chapter, I explore the possibility of how value can be given in both Heidegger and Scheler. By bringing Scheler and Heidegger into relief, we can achieve several things. First, I can show how distinctive Scheler is to those unfamiliar with his work since many working in phenomenology may not have read Scheler but certainly studied Heidegger. Second, we can look at value itself to see which form of phenomenology can capture how values are given. The “how of givenness” (if we were to call it that) is the manner in which a phenomenon can be given (as it appears). Thus, if we take a look at both Scheler and Heidegger, we can address their conceptions of phenomenology as limiting or enabling the givenness of value. On a whole, phenomenology’s development issues more from Heidegger’s influence than Scheler. Heidegger interprets value as present-at-hand and I argue this follows from the limits imposed by his hermeneutic phenomenology. Values are ontic for Heidegger.

**Phenomenological Gestures in Scheler’s Formalism**

In Scheler’s magnum opus, the *Formalism in Ethics and the Non-formal Ethics of Value: A New Attempt Toward the Foundation of an Ethical Personalism*, he is silent on what values are exactly, but phenomenologically describes them. Scholars familiar with Scheler’s work will note that many times in the *Formalism*, Scheler will assert the ideality of value and refer to the rank of values as an eternal order. However, he will never spell out the ontological nature of value nor how it is that they are eternal though his language will assert their eternal objectivity. Thus, if we can establish the givenness of value itself and what that requires independently of either Schelerian or Heideggerian phenomenology, then we can recommend either Heidegger or Scheler’s phenomenological approach. Thus, this chapter is not an analysis of the historical relation between Scheler and...
Heidegger. Rather, this chapter works out value’s givenness itself in relation by considering two phenomenological frameworks together.

Scheler offered tiny clues in the *Formalism* as to what he thought phenomenology could do for him. These insights were given in the introduction between the central preoccupations of method. For Heidegger, phenomenology was the way into working out the problem of Being in his fundamental ontology in *Being and Time*, yet the problem presented itself when Heidegger construed phenomenology as a hermeneutic turn. While Scheler was not necessarily preoccupied with method in the same way Heidegger responded to Husserl, Scheler can still be analyzed in terms of what he claimed about phenomenology in the *Formalism*. Primarily, Scheler was interested in developing his personalism against the background of Kant’s moral philosophy. We must look past the *Formalism*. Heidegger was preoccupied with method, but Heidegger’s “method” comes across indirectly as a consequence of interrogating Dasein about the question of the meaning of Being and the history of ontology.

In what follows, I want to ask the questions: What is the givenness of value? How is value experienced in its givenness? If I can answer these questions, then it is the phenomenological criterion of value itself that can answer which phenomenological framework better suits value’s givenness. I will first discuss Scheler and then move to Heidegger.

**Scheler’s Intuition of Essences**

Scheler’s conception of phenomenology is explicated in Chapter 2 of the *Formalism*. In the *Formalism*, he outlined his concepts of the a priori and phenomenological intuition, or what he called “essential intuiting” (*Wesensschau*). Scheler designated “as ‘a priori’ all those ideal units of meaning and those propositions that are self-given by way of an immediate intuitive content in the absence of any kind of positing.”¹ Like Husserl, phenomenology is opposed to the natural attitude and is, therefore, a special type of experience.² In the natural attitude, we regard phenomena as a natural fact described by the sciences, and in this standpoint, phenomena are described from a third-person perspective. The natural attitude seeks only to describe from an objective or impartial perspective. It does not pay attention to how phenomena are disclosed to us in the first-person perspective, and the
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