

Frozen Justice

Lessons from Bosnia and Herzegovina's Failed
Transitional Justice Strategy

Jared O. Bell

Series in Sociology



VERNON PRESS

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www.vernonpress.com

In the Americas:
Vernon Press
1000 N West Street,
Suite 1200, Wilmington,
Delaware 19801
United States

In the rest of the world:
Vernon Press
C/Sancti Espiritu 17,
Malaga, 29006
Spain

Series in Sociology

Library of Congress Control Number: 2018946731

ISBN: 978-1-62273-204-3

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Dedication

This book's dedication is twofold. First, to everyone from friends, family, and faculty, to other professional mentors who encouraged me to dream and reach for all that I could be, thank you. For all those who encouraged me to stay focused at times when I lost sight of the bigger plan and my dreams, thank you. I will hold tightly to this encouragement and warm sentiments as I move forward in my career. Second, this book is also dedicated to the hundreds of people in Sarajevo, Mostar, and Banja Luka who participated in this survey and to all those who were willing to meet with me to discuss life and politics in Bosnia and Herzegovina when I was on the ground. This book would not exist without your willingness to participate and share your views and perspectives. I'm indebted forever. Thank you.

Acknowledgements

I would like to thank and acknowledge the following people below, without whose input and/or mentorship this book would not have been possible: Dr. Ismael Muvingi, Nova Southeastern University, Dr. Dustin Berna, Nova Southeastern University, Dr. Cheryl Duckworth, Nova Southeastern University, Mr. Damir Jusić, University of Sarajevo, Mr. Denis Džidić, Balkans Investigative Reporting Network, Ms. Velma Šarić, Post-Conflict Research Center, Ms. Aleksandra Letić, Helsinki Committee for Human Rights in Republika Srpska, Mr. Muamer Šadinlija, Dr. Joseph Kaminski, International University of Sarajevo, Dr. Peter Plenta, International University of Sarajevo, Dr. Nathan Munier, International University of Sarajevo, Dr. Emil Knezović, International University of Sarajevo, Nermin Čakić, International University of Sarajevo.

Chapter 1

Introduction

Jared O. Bell

In response to the heinous crimes committed in Bosnia and Herzegovina and elsewhere in the former Yugoslavia from the early to mid-1990s the United Nations Security Council created the International Criminal Court for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) based in The Hague, Netherlands in May of 1993 to punish those who committed gross acts of human rights and genocide. The tribunals have heard lots of cases since its inception and have tried numerous perpetrators from the soldiers who carried out the killings to the leaders who orchestrated and ordered them. Despite, these successes, the ICTY and its mission remain highly controversial. One of the main major questions asked by some experts, scholars, and everyday citizens is whether or not this tribunal did enough to foster healing and reconciliation in many of the societies that were fractured by these conflicts. There are varying opinions on how to answer this question; many scholars will argue that the tribunals operated adequately within their mandate and with what they could to promote justice and reconciliation, while many who lived through the brutal wars would argue that there simply has been no justice. Bosnia and Herzegovina in particular still remains a country divided on issues of post-conflict justice among many other things.

Years later, a new government led draft strategy emerged in 2010. It was designed to be a comprehensive plan tasked to deal with unfinished transitional justice “business” and to promote reconciliation. However, the strategy has completely failed and there is currently no political will or momentum to revive it. But, did this strategy actually have any chance of being successful from the beginning? The purpose of this research was to explore this question by examining whether or not this strategy could foster reconciliation from the perspective of the everyday populace in Bosnia and Herzegovina, as well as explicate and analyze other elements surrounding domestic attempts at transitional justice throughout the country that may have contributed to this strategy’s failure. The research discussed in this book took place in the form of a quantitative study which examined the perspective of Bosnians on the subject of the National Transitional Justice Strategy and reconciliation through a survey conducted in three major cities, Sarajevo, Mostar, and Banja Luka, where 487 participants were surveyed from June to August of 2015.

Many have asked me over the course of my academic and professional life, why I chose Bosnia and Herzegovina out of the many different transitional justice contexts that currently exist within the field. One answer is that I vividly remember the war playing out on television from even as far as Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania. The all-out warfare I saw on television perplexed me and frightened me at the same time. Naïve and not knowing any better I wondered if the United States could descend into such violence one day. When I decided to pursue peace and conflict studies academically, Bosnia and Herzegovina was one of the clearest cases that came to my mind with much curiosity and I found myself consumed with writing about the conflict and the post-conflict developments almost every chance I got. As I continue to conduct my research today, I believe there is still a lot to be learned from Bosnia and Herzegovina. The country is still transitioning to a full democracy and at the same time still dealing with post-conflict justice. But, the process has been frozen, as is indicated by the title of this book, by a variety of factors that this book seeks to explicate and discuss.

What is Transitional Justice?

Today, transitional justice is a quickly emerging field birthed from an array of inter-disciplinary studies ranging from conflict resolution to international development. The term transitional justice is defined as:

a response to systemic or widespread violations of human rights. It seeks recognition for victims and promotion possibilities for peace, reconciliation, and democracy. Transitional justice is not a form of justice, but justice adapted to societies transforming themselves after a period of pervasive human rights abuses. (International Center for Transitional Justice, 2009, p. 1)

Developing transitional mechanisms and processes can be rather difficult and lengthy. In fact, Rhot-Arriaza (2006) notes that the term transitional justice itself may be misleading simply because the processes themselves may not take place in the immediate period after conflict. Moreover, she emphasizes the fact that transitions to peace and democracy may take decades. She also notes that some aspects of transition may take longer than others:

[s]ome of the major factors societies must address are:

“How much should they remember? How much should they forget? What should they teach their children? What should become of the leaders who orchestrated the discord and violence? The underlings who carried it out? The bystanders who did nothing to stop it? Where should they draw the

boundary between enough justice to destroy impunity and punishment so harsh that it becomes revenge? And how can they reunite communities where thousands of people have been raped, maimed, and tortured by their fellow citizens". (Stover & Weinstein, 2004, p. 2)

Such questions are wrought in a moral quagmire that is rooted in a search for justice and healing. Notions and concepts of justice are pluralistic and intersect with a variety of ideas, philosophies, and values. Justice, like beauty, is in the eye of the beholder and can be interpreted in a myriad of ways. For some people, justice could mean securing employment and a steady income, while some others may seek criminal trials, or official confessions or apologies (Stover & Weinstein, 2004). These societies are faced with vital dilemmas, such as how to implement a method of justice to which all members of society can ascribe.

Problems That Still Haunt Bosnia and Herzegovina

The first problem that continually plagues Bosnia and Herzegovina is that many political and social issues still stem from a lack of justice, accountability, reconciliation, and collective memorializing stemming from the 1992-1995 war. Moreover, one of the key issues in trying to create sustainable transitional justice mechanisms to deal with the past is that they have been extremely difficult to implement, gain collective support for, and has caused more political and social tensions than has fostered reconciliation. For many individuals in Bosnia and Herzegovina, justice has been a tiresome and overwhelming process. Even with the trials in The Hague and domestic efforts, for many, justice still seems to be elusive.

These notions inform the second problem, disillusionment. Many Bosnians are disillusioned by talk of justice and reconciliation and have lost faith in having any comprehensive process for dealing with the past, especially one led by the government. In a country where many of the same political factions who jockeyed for war some 20-odd years ago are still relatively in power and a plethora of development and economic issues exist, the possibility of sweeping post-conflict justice measures and complete reconciliation seems improbable currently. It is important to remember that transitional justice strategies are public policies, and they will not likely be successful without proper public interest and political support. How much political support can truly be garnered when the country's political elites attack the legitimacy of the rulings handed down by the ICTY and domestic courts?

Attempting to implement a method of justice that all of society can accept has been a challenge for Bosnia and Herzegovina. The conflict in Bosnia and Herzegovina that pitted neighbor against neighbor was the worst violence in Europe had seen since World War II and still has lasting effects today. It has

been 23 years since the Dayton Peace Accords were signed and the conflict ended. Unfortunately, Bosnia and Herzegovina still remains a politically weak and ethnically fragmented state. Social reconstruction and reclamation have been slackened to say the least. In addition to Bosnia's divided state- and entity-level governing structures, the country's political power is further diluted by an extensive bureaucracy, which serves ten cantons, 149 municipalities, and the autonomous District of Brčko. Consequently, Bosnia and Herzegovina also lacks the social and political cohesion necessary to further post-war development and reconciliation (Moratti & Sabic-El-Rayess, 2009, p. 31). Moratti and Sabic-El-Rayess (2009) explain further that the lack of social cohesion rests on the fact that corruption remains high and trust in governmental structures and ineffective public administration remain low in Bosnia and Herzegovina today.

The authors also further explain that prior to the onset of the Bosnian war, the country's moderate level of economic development was coupled with an adequate social safety net, including health care and an educational infrastructure for its citizenry. The war severely slowed Bosnia's economic and social development, and post-war economic recovery has been primarily fueled by international assistance (Moratti & Sabic-El-Rayess, 2009).

The international community continues to push for a multi-ethnic state as the only viable solution for Bosnia and Herzegovina. Nonetheless, with the country's internal division along ethnic lines and the frequently obstructive behavior of local leaders, the international community has faced difficulties in rebuilding Bosnia's state institutions (Moretti & Sabic-El-Rayess, 2009, p. 8). In tandem with the European Union, United Nations, Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE), World Bank (WB), and other international organizations, the Office of the High Representative (OHR) has played a particularly important role in the development of political processes by applying polipressure in post-war Bosnia (Moratti & Sabic-El-Rayess, 2009, p. 8). As noted earlier, while the international community saw the Tribunal as the appropriate response to war crimes and genocide, domestically within Bosnia and Herzegovina, the process is extremely controversial. Members of the different ethnic groups that comprise the country feel in one way or another that the Tribunal targeted their ethnic group for prosecutions while the crimes of other ethnicities went unpunished, or some feel the sentences were too light for in comparison to the crimes that were committed. Also, the Tribunal has prosecuted higher level cases, leaving many perpetrators to the backlogged and ill-equipped Bosnian judicial system.

It is important to distinguish between judicial and non-judicial transitional justice. Before the end of the mandate for the ICTY, a War Crimes Chamber was added to Bosnia's court system. But, the process of doling out war crimes

sentences has been extremely slow. Mallinder (2013) notes that the lower court system is also inefficient. Further, there is very little trust or faith in the court system to punish abusers. She further explains that the War Crimes Chamber of the Bosnian Judicial system is designed to work with local courts. The War Crimes Chamber is tasked with adjudicating on the most serious war crimes cases, while also having the power to refer the least complicated cases to local courts. She contends that while the bulk of the remaining cases in Bosnia will be tried by lower courts, they are ill-equipped to do so, due to a lack of resources, vulnerability to political pressure, and a plethora of outstanding war crimes cases (Mallinder, 2013).

She later explains that in order to address some of these problems, Bosnia's Criminal Procedure Code was amended in 2003 to harmonize legal procedures across the country and to introduce innovations to speed up trials, such as the use of plea bargains. However, these innovations have not been without their share of criticism, for example, many victims oppose the greater leniency offered by plea bargains (Mallinder, 2013, p. 63).

The author also maintains that non-judicial transitional mechanisms attempted (ranging from establishing truth commissions to memorialization projects) in Bosnia on local levels and by civil society organizations have largely failed (Mallinder, 2003). International scholars and academics have argued as to whether or not the true reconciliation and acceptance of the past is actually possible in Bosnia. So, it is truly fitting to explore the perspectives of Bosnians on the issues, especially as a draft Transitional Justice Strategy has been tasked to deal with "unfinished" business from the 1992-1995 war.

Introduction to the Strategy

As noted earlier, the draft National Transitional Justice Strategy discussed in this book was commissioned in 2010. The strategy was drafted by a team of 15 experts, chosen by the Council of Ministers, in collaboration with the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), and it wrestles with the most sensitive issues in post-war Bosnian society, ranging from the establishment of the facts behind war crimes to reparations, memorials for victims, and institutional reform (Džidić, 2012, para. 1).

Moreover, the Strategy proposes the creation of non-judicial mechanisms to establish facts about the Bosnian war and to encourage people to come forward with their accounts. The five key areas this Strategy aimed to address in particular was truth and fact finding, institutional reform, rehabilitation, and compensation. The vision behind this strategy was to create an open, practical, and productive dialogue about the past across all levels of Bosnian society so that the past is no longer distorted (Džidić, 2012). According to the strategy,

the goal is to achieve satisfactory outcomes for victims and to build efficient, professional, and credible public institutions (Džidić, 2012).

To further this vision, the expert group put forward various proposals to the government of Bosnia and Herzegovina. “To give victims of the Bosnian war the right to “truth,” the Strategy advises speeding-up the search for the 10,000 people who remain missing and creating a non-judicial fact finding mechanism, though the document does not discuss the mandate or form of such a mechanism” (Džidić, 201, para. 5). Other major goals of the Strategy include improving the rehabilitation mechanisms to overcome the consequences of the 1992-1995 war; or to establish a comprehensive and modern legal framework for continuous vetting of employees in public institution at all levels of government and that all institutions operate from a point of full transparency and accountability to citizens. Another key goal is to educate the general public and institutions about the importance of transitional justice in processes and institutional reform in post conflict societies. The strategy also boasts strategic goals for compensation in the way of both material and symbolic reparations.

During the drafting of the Strategy, five rounds of thematic consultations were held, participants of the consultations were representatives of the civil society organizations, journalists, representatives of religious communities, human rights organizations, women and other organizations dealing with gender equality issues, youth organizations, veterans' associations, associations of the people treated for post-traumatic stress disorder, representatives of associations and families of victims experts from relevant fields of expertise, and representatives of institutions at all levels of government responsible implementing the Transitional Justice Strategy (Bosnia and Herzegovina Ministry for Human Rights and Refugees and Bosnia and Herzegovina Ministry of Justice, 2013). A lot of emphasis was placed on having various civil society groups present because it was believed that civil society could be a bridge between the general population and those who were implementing the strategy at the state level.

The designing of the Transitional Justice Strategy took place in three phases. The first phase of creating a Transitional Justice Strategy, which lasted between April and July 2010, consultations focused on the situation analysis and identification of strategic issues and problems. During the second phase, which lasted between August and December 2010, participants of the consultations discussed relevant strategic objectives and activities as responses to the problems identified previously. During the third and final phase, the working group discussed impact assessment indicators, initial budget factors for the implementation of the activities required to reach the objectives and

organized a series of public debates on the proposed Strategy (Bosnia and Herzegovina Ministry for Human Rights et al., 2013, p. 104).

It is important to note that this Strategy's development was not considered a panacea for all of the country's post-war ills and nor should it be. It intersects with other post-war strategies such as the Justice Sector Reform Strategy in Bosnia and Herzegovina, the Revised Strategy of Bosnia and Herzegovina for the Implementation of Annex VII of the Dayton Peace Agreement, the National War Crimes Strategy, the Public Administration Reform Strategy, and finally the Gender Action Plan and the Action Plan for the Implementation of UNSCR 1325 in Bosnia and Herzegovina, 2010-2013 (Bosnia and Herzegovina Ministry for Human Rights et al, 2013). The section of the Transitional Justice Strategy addressing compensation as a form of reparations builds on that part of the Justice Sector Reform Strategy in Bosnia and Herzegovina.

During the consultation process, the lack of pro bono legal aid for victims of war when they are trying to exercise their right to compensation was identified as one of the key problems. For this reason, the implementation of the Justice Sector Reform Strategy in Bosnia and Herzegovina is important for the country to fulfill its obligations toward victims in terms of providing them pro bono legal aid services in support of their efforts to exercise their rights. Also, transitional justice is a sub-strategy of the overall Strategy for Judicial Reform.

Finally, according to the government appointed expert group, the Bosnian government would have spent roughly €9m on the Strategy; however, this amount does not take into account the full costs of the reparations program or the construction of memorials (Džidić, 2012). The Strategy calls for an implementation monitoring commission to oversee the implementation that consisted of representatives of the four key sectors: the executive authorities, professional community, the civil society and the Bosnia and Herzegovina Parliamentary Assembly. The executive authorities included one representative from each major governing body, the Council of Ministers, the Republika Srpska Government, the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina Government and the Brčko District Government (Bosnia and Herzegovina Ministry for Human Rights et al, 2013, p. 11).

The Strategy however, has not been implemented due to some major issues. Interest from political officials in both entities of Bosnia and Herzegovina considerably waned early on in the process. According to a report by the Ministry of Justice of Bosnia and Herzegovina (2013) immediately after its establishment, the expert working group worked in an efficient manner, however the absences of expert working members from relevant ministries of both entity governments, started to threaten legitimacy of the working group and actual complexion of the document (p. 35). This specifically relates to the

representatives of one ministry of Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina ministry and three ministries of Republika Srpska (Ministry of Justice of Bosnia and Herzegovina, 2013).

“Representatives from the three ministries of Republika Srpska Government stopped attending the meetings when EWG attempted to formulate framework strategic goals and when the representatives of the ministries of RS Government expressed reservations about the part of the proposed strategic objectives” (Ministry of Justice of Bosnia and Herzegovina, 2013, p. 35). Not too long after the Republika Srpska Minister of Justice sent a letter to expert working group and announced that a representative of that ministry will not participate in any more meetings, until Republika Srpska Government takes position about the draft of strategic objectives and adopts appropriate guidelines on how to continue the work with the expert group (Ministry of Justice of Bosnia and Herzegovina, 2013, p. 35). The expert working group held a few more public activities that aimed to engage various stakeholders in 2012 and in 2013 the aforementioned report maintains that the council of minister continued to debate the Transitional Justice Strategy, with the Republika Srpska still holding to earlier reservations (Ministry of Justice of Bosnia and Herzegovina, 2013). Following this period, very little seems to have been done or even reported on by official government agencies of the media.

What This Work Seeks to Do

The purpose of this study was to explore the perspectives of the general populace on Bosnia and Herzegovina’s draft Transitional Justice Strategy and reconciliation. This study was designed with three main purposes in mind: (a) To gauge the opinion of members from the general Bosnian populace on whether or not they think their government can be implicit in fostering reconciliation among the everyday populace; (b) To determine whether or not people in the general Bosnian populace think that reconciliation is at all possible; (c) To examine and analyze variances between respondents from different locations, ages, genders, and ethnicities on the topics of transitional justice and reconciliation.

To this end there are four major hypothesis areas that guide the analysis of data collected for this book:

1. (Null) H_0 : There will be no association between belief in the effectiveness of the Transitional Justice Strategy and belief that the Bosnian government’s efforts will lead to reconciliation.

(Alternative) H_A : There will be association between belief in the effectiveness of the Transitional Justice Strategy and belief that the Bosnian government's efforts will lead to reconciliation.

2. (Null) H_0 : There will be no statistically significant difference in the perspectives on whether it is possible for Bosnia and Herzegovina to move on between Bosniaks and Croats, and Serbs.

(Alternative) H_A : Bosniaks and Croats will be more likely to believe that it is possible for Bosnia and Herzegovina to move on than Serbs.

3. (Null) H_0 : There will be no statistically significant difference between those who believe that the government of Bosnia and Herzegovina can lead efforts toward reconciliation between respondents between the ages of 18 and 33 and respondents between the ages of 55 and 65.

(Alternative) H_A : Respondents between the ages of 18 and 33 will be more likely to believe that the government of Bosnia and Herzegovina can lead efforts towards reconciliation than respondents between the ages of 55 and 65.

4. (Null) H_0 : There will be no difference in belief that the draft Transitional Justice Strategy's five key areas will be adequate in helping Bosnia and Herzegovina address its issues between men and women.

(Alternative) H_A : Compared to women, men will be more likely to believe that the draft Transitional Justice Strategy's five key areas will be adequate in helping Bosnia and Herzegovina address its issues.

The Importance of This Research

As noted earlier, this research aims to contribute to a wide array of emerging transitional justice research projects to help us understand how to respond to human rights abuses and their aftermath. To this end, Palmer et al. (2013) notes that in the past two decades, numerous approaches to transitional justice have been advocated for and implemented. They elaborate: [t]ruth commissions, criminal trials, reparations programs, and commemoration initiatives are now routinely established in response to serious human rights violations. This burgeoning practice has been accompanied by a wide range of

research projects, informing the design, implementation, and assessment of these justice initiatives. In many of these cases, human rights practice has driven the development of scholarship and certain advocacy agendas have profoundly shaped research. (Palmer et al., 2013, p. 19)

The field of transitional justice has grown exponentially from its roots in the political study of the nature of transition and the application of international law to these contexts (University of Ulster Transitional Justice Institute, 2013). Scholarship in this field now incorporates a broad range of interdisciplinary focuses which add considerable depth to the study of the mechanisms and processes employed by societies moving from conflict to peace and from repressive rule towards democracy contexts (University of Ulster Transitional Justice Institute, 2013). The University of Ulster Transitional Justice Institute (2013) reports, “[t]he inclusion of a broader range of disciplinary perspectives has also brought with it an increased diversity of theoretical and methodological approaches to the field and scholarship in general” (para. 1).

Both qualitative and quantitative methods have come to be used in assessing transitional justice methods. Pham and Vanick (2007) maintain that “human rights and transitional justice researchers often debate the value of either qualitative or quantitative methods, and sometimes of both of them” (p. 234). The authors further argue that

a common mistake is to assert that either method is intrinsically superior to the other. The two methods have distinctly different purposes and should be seen as complementary. Research is not solely about collecting qualitative or quantitative data, but, rather, involves the strategic collection of data that will best benefit the objectives of the research and assist in evidence-based decision making for program and policy development. (Pham & Vanick, 2007, p. 234)

Pham and Vanick (2007) also argue that qualitative research offers a depth and richness of response that illuminates the dynamics of the process under study. The authors emphasize that in contrast, quantitative research methods entail the collection and/or analysis of data that can be measured numerically. Concerning this study, they note that in terms of transitional justice, quantitative data can be used to measure the frequency of support for various mechanisms and even to establish association of these attitudes with predictive factors such as exposure to trauma; qualitative data are best placed to describe what people understand by keywords such as justice or reconciliation (Pham and Vanick, 2007).

Pham and Vanick point out some very important aspects that are essential to understanding the research presented in this book and why I chose to use a

quantitative method. I chose to employ a quantitative method because I wanted more of a general picture of what Bosnians thought about the strategy versus interviewing maybe 20-30 people to only get what I feel would be a small part of a much larger story. With the methodology I used, I believe I obtained many more perspectives. I do not disagree with what authors have to say concerning how often people rate qualitative or quantitative research as one being better than the other. This indeed is often the case, and researchers often feel that they have to choose one over the other. For this particular research project I believe that a quantitative method was the right fit because, outside of wanting to be able to get a much larger picture, I wanted to also measure and establish associations between variables. For instance, as I measured the association between ethnicity and the respondents' opinions on whether or not they believed Bosnia and Herzegovina could move forward as a country. I also believe that a quantitative study, in terms of this project, offers more substantial data that can be used to inform further research.

There are also debates in the field arguing that transitional justice research must be more practice focused in order to make results more empirical. Along these lines, Fischer (2011) argues that research needs to be practice-orientated and should generate policy recommendations; and at the same time, it must not create a set of blueprints that policy makers can use as for broad application for all contexts, since what is helpful in one context may be irrelevant or even harmful in another (p. 4). Fischer (2011) also maintains that

“in order to achieve more reliable results, research has to involve, as much as possible, partners and actors from the countries in question. It has been recommended that views of the affected populations have to play a major role in decisions on how societies should deal with the past and that there is a need to listen to the people Action research can prepare the ground for this”. (p. 5)

Kritz (2009) also notes that the more empirical the research, the better policy choices can be made when it comes to developing transitional justice mechanisms and policies. He further asserts that in this way, empirical research allows for the testing of the current assumptions guiding transitional justice policies (Kritz, 2009). Kritz's (2009) rationale for this is that “empirical research should be built upon to determine whether certain types of transitional justice mechanisms are more appropriate than others in specific kinds of transitions” (p. 15).

It is within these sentiments that the research for this book is rooted. There remains large gaps in empirical research when it comes to assessing transitional justice processes and whether or not they can actually foster reconcilia-

tion, healing, or even victim satisfaction. This book aims to serve as a springboard for discussion not only on the ongoing process of transitional justice in Bosnia and Herzegovina but also as one that can be used across other transitional justice contexts as well.

Overall, I believe this book contributes to scholarship on transitional justice and reconciliation in the three following ways:

First, by examining the Transitional Justice Strategy and its prescribed mechanisms and their impact on reconciliation in Bosnian society, one can learn more about identifying possible obstacles to reconciliation in all post-conflict societies. While every post-conflict society is different, each case presents circumstances that can be used in contrast and comparison to another. In academic scholarship on transitional justice, scholars, experts, and policy makers do not always have to reinvent the proverbial wheel; they can use what they know to avoid certain mistakes or create successes when employing certain strategies and mechanisms.

Second, there are lessons to be learned by exploring the realities of transitional justice mechanisms from a theoretical aspect compared to the expectations of the people whose lives they are aimed at transforming. In understanding the difference experts and practitioners can ameliorate processes on the ground; after all, transitional justice mechanisms are aimed at reconciling people and societies. Therefore, it is important to know and understand how the people in a given society view a particular mechanism and what their expectations of this mechanism are in relation to their own reconciling. The more researchers can gauge and understand people's expectations, the better they can develop policies and mechanisms that are effective.

Third and finally, transitional justice discourse is enhanced by analyzing how gender, ethnicity, and age impact one's view on reconciliation and transitional justice mechanisms and strategies. The factors mentioned immediately above are extremely important when exploring how someone may perceive transitional justice mechanisms. By understanding more about how gender, ethnicity, and age impact views of transitional justice, scholars and practitioners may be able to develop strategies and mechanisms that are sensitive to this and therefore, may have more of an impact on fostering reconciliation and healing.

Chapter Overviews

The following topics of each chapter within this book will be discussed as follows:

Chapter 1: Chapter one briefly explains the transitional justice processes that have been utilized in Bosnia and Herzegovina and the country's struggles with moving on from the 1992-1995 conflict. This chapter also lays out the draft Transitional Justice Strategy of Bosnia and Herzegovina and its key functions. This chapter also lays out the purpose and rationale of the book and its contributions to the transitional justice field and its research.

Chapter 2: Chapter two explores different transitional justice theories and the mechanism the different mechanisms utilized within them.

Chapter 3: Chapter three explores the dimensions of implementing transitional justice mechanisms in a post-conflict society.

Chapter 4: Chapter four examines the nexus between transitional justice and its links to reconciliation.

Chapter 5: Chapter five gives a survey of pre and post war Bosnian history, which lays out some key important historic events that are important for understanding the political and social context of Bosnia and Herzegovina today.

Chapter 6: Chapter six looks at the processes of transitional justice in Bosnia and Herzegovina within the context of the International Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia and domestic progress towards transitional justice. As well as, offers an exploration of attitudes towards reconciliation and post-conflict justice and reconciliation in Bosnia and Herzegovina.

Chapter 7: Chapter seven explores the progress of transitional from other former Yugoslav domestic contexts.

Chapter 8: Chapter eight discusses the methodological framework that was designed for this particular study, including how the study was conducted, the selection of the sample, survey questions, as well as the data Analysis that was used.

Chapter 9: Chapter nine discusses the study results by looking at the findings from both the surveys and the hypothetical tests. This chapter seeks to connect some of the key theoretical aspects discussed earlier in the book with the aim, process, and execution of the Transitional Justice Strategy and how they impacted perceptions of it.

Chapter 10: Chapter ten presents a summary, conclusions, and lessons we can draw from Bosnia and Herzegovina's that can be considered in other transitional justice processes in the region and across the globe for policy makers, academics, and practitioners.

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